by Paul Krugman
Raj Chetty stands up valiantly for the honor of his and my
profession, arguing that economics is too a science in which careful research
is used to falsify some hypotheses and lend credibility to others. And in many
ways I agree: there is a lot of good research in economics, maybe more than
ever as the focus has shifted somewhat from theoretical models loosely inspired
by observation — which, as he suggests, was my forte — to nitty-gritty
empirical work.
But while there are clearly
scientific elements in economics, a lot of economists aren’t behaving like scientists.
Look at Chetty’s examples of scientific work that informs current policy
debates:
Consider the politically charged
question of whether extending unemployment benefits increases unemployment
rates by reducing workers’ incentives to return to work. Nearly a dozen
economic studies have analyzed this question by comparing unemployment rates in
states that have extended unemployment benefits with those in states that do
not. These studies approximate medical experiments in which some groups receive
a treatment — in this case, extended unemployment benefits — while “control”
groups don’t.
These studies have uniformly found
that a 10-week extension in unemployment benefits raises the average amount of
time people spend out of work by at most one week. This simple, unassailable
finding implies that policy makers can extend unemployment benefits to provide
assistance to those out of work without substantially increasing unemployment
rates.
Other economic studies have taken
advantage of the constraints inherent in a particular policy to obtain
scientific evidence. An excellent recent example concerned health insurance in
Oregon. In 2008, the state of Oregon decided to expand its state health
insurance program to cover additional low-income individuals, but it had
funding to cover only a small fraction of the eligible families. In
collaboration with economics researchers, the state designed a lottery
procedure by which individuals who received the insurance could be compared
with those who did not, creating in effect a first-rate randomized experiment.
The study found that getting
insurance coverage increased the use of health care, reduced financial strain
and improved well-being — results that now provide invaluable guidance in
understanding what we should expect from the Affordable Care Act.
OK, he’s right that these two
examples show how evidence could be used to inform policy debate (although
understanding the effects of unemployment insurance, I would argue, requires
embedding it in a macro story about how the number of jobs is determined.) But
are such results actually being used to inform policy debate? Have conservative
economists like Casey Mulligan said “OK, we were wrong to argue
that extended unemployment benefits are the cause of high unemployment”? Have
economists who oppose Obamacare said, “OK, we were wrong to say that Medicaid
hurts its recipients?”
You know the answer.
And it’s not just policy debates. Whole
subfields of economics, notably but not only business-cycle macro, have spent
decades chasing their own tails because too many economists refuse to accept
empirical evidence that rejects their approach.
The point is that while Chetty is right that economics can be and
sometimes is a scientific field in the sense that theories are testable and
there are researchers doing the testing, all too many economists treat their
field as a form of theology instead.
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